





























Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Walsh, B. (2019). China’s Pervasive yet Forgotten Regional Security Role in Africa. Journal of contemporary
china, 28(120), 965-983. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1594107
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2021
1 
 
China’s pervasive yet forgotten Regional Security role in Africa 
Dr. Barney Walsh* 
African Leadership Centre, King’s College London  
 
 Abstract 
This article argues for a re-examination of China’s engagement with Africa. Rather 
than offering broad continental generalisations, or concentrating only on individual 
country case-studies, researchers and analysts would be better served by recognising 
and understanding the specific and varied regional contexts in which relations occur. 
Utilising Hettne’s conception of regionalism and regionalisation processes, and over 
one hundred field work interviews, the article presents a broad continental overview 
of China’s role in Africa followed by a more detailed case study of China’s role in 
East Africa. The article argues that the regional reality of African security dynamics 
enmeshes China into intra-regional geopolitics and complex local level security 
issues, and sees the relationship greatly affected by the varied behaviour and agency 
of the African leaders.  
 
Introduction 
China’s relationship with Africa from 2000 onwards is a distinct period in their shared, 
deeply interwoven history. Chinese presence in Africa has greatly transformed over the last 
18 years and counting. It has created a complex, dynamic and often misunderstood 
relationship. The previous decades of cooperation - oft-referenced by current leaders from 
both China and Africa - was far more fluctuating and problematic than is now proclaimed. 
Now, too, the modern era is far more complicated than leaders would perhaps like to 
publicise.1 
The modern relationship, heralded as a win-win scenario between erstwhile south-south 
allies, is multi-faceted and non-linear: but China’s thirst for oil and natural resources remains 
centrally important.2 The Forum for China-African Cooperation (FOCAC) has garnered 
attention as a grandiose biennial celebration of the relationship, and engagement with 
Africa’s different Regional Economic Communities (RECs) does occur to varying degrees. 
But China retains a fundamentally state-centric focus. Beijing champions its non-interference 
principle more loudly than ever when protecting its bilateral relationships. China’s impact on 
African security issues, therefore, is less obvious than some other world powers which has 
resulted in a dearth of analysis. Africa’s inherently regional character is simultaneously 
missed from much China-Africa literature, which is particularly important to assessing 
security dynamics.  
This article argues for a re-examination of China’s engagement with Africa. Rather than 
offering broad continental generalisations, or concentrating only on individual country case-
                                                          
* Barney Walsh, barney.walsh@kcl.ac.uk   
1 Leaders today tend to ignore: Chinese support for African rebel movements against non-white, democratically 
elected, independent governments; China’s cynical manipulation of African states and rebel movements during 
the Sino-Soviet dispute; China’s ‘withdrawal’ from Africa during the 1980s, which certainly occurred despite 
certain relations being maintained; and the African states failing to condemn China following the 1989 
Tiananmen Square massacre. 
2 Sigfrido Caceres and Sophal Ear, ‘The Geopolitics of China's Global Resources Quest’, Geopolitics 17(1), 
(2012), p. 62. 
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studies, researchers and analysts would be better served by recognising and understanding the 
specific and varied regional contexts in which relations occur. It begins with the premises 
that: African security issues are inevitably affected by China due to their historic and 
expanding presence on the continent, despite Beijing’s non-interference principle and 
apparent aversion to ‘traditional’ military responses; and that Africa’s regional character must 
be understood and analysed in order to uncover these effects.  
The article asks how are Africa’s regional security issues impacted upon by China and how 
are China-Africa relations affected therein? It utilises Hettne’s concepts of regionalism and 
regionalisation processes, and a holistic, constructivist security framework, to argue that both 
the Chinese state and China-Africa scholars often misunderstand important regional nuances 
within African security dynamics. The article discusses the varied security issues and state 
building processes underway in each African region, focusing on a few key areas where 
China seemingly plays a role in security issues therein. It showcases how African security 
dynamics enmesh China into intra-regional geopolitics and complex local-level security 
issues and sees the relationship greatly affected by the varied behaviour and agency of the 
African leaders encountered. The article then provides a more detailed case study analysis of 
how these trends manifest in East Africa, highlighting the region’s interesting specificities 
that, although varied and unique, offer insights into the wider China-Africa relationship. The 
starting point of analysis is Africa’s regional security, not Chinese action, resulting in a more 
African-centric analysis that is often missed by other scholars.   
This article is based on over four years of research, mostly undertaken as part of the author’s 
PhD programme. This included over one hundred semi-structured fieldwork interviews 
conducted with politicians, diplomats, military personal, government officials, security 
analysts and local citizens. Interviews were mostly conducted in East Africa from 2013 to 
2015, along with several in South Africa during various FOCAC VI side-line events in 
December 2015. This article also forms part of the African Leadership Centre’s ongoing 
research agenda, titled Peace, Society and the State in Africa. 
Following this introduction, the below section explains that China-Africa scholars have 
mostly failed to articulate the regional character of relations which has contributed to the lack 
of serious security analysis. The article then discusses the utility of Hettne’s concepts of 
regionalism and regionalisation, in understanding the African Union’s formal regional 
institution building efforts and the more complex informal regional dynamics shaping 
security issues. The following section offers a broad description of China’s regional role 
across the continent. It focuses on a few useful examples of how China has impacted security 
somewhat differently in each African region, in regard to geopolitical relations, local security 
issues and the different national leaders who have both utilised and resisted China’s presence 
to varying extents. Subsequently, the article offers a more detailed case study of China’s role 
in East Africa, showcasing China’s role within regional integration, the oil sector, and anti-
terrorist efforts. It notes President Museveni of Uganda as a particularly influential leader 
exercising agency against China. The article then calls for a regional analytical framework for 
scholarship assessing China-Africa relations, particularly regarding security analyses. Finally, 
the conclusion suggests that China should also pursue a more sophisticated and nuanced 
regional strategy in Africa, which will be difficult to achieve under its current state-centric 
mindset.    
Lack of regional security analysis 
Two major, interlinked gaps appear within the China-Africa literature: lack of a regional 
analysis, which contributes to the lack of serious security analysis. China-Africa scholarship 
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tends to be either overly broad by looking at ‘China in Africa’ or concentrated on country-
specific case studies (which still lean toward obvious, somewhat infamous examples such as 
Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Angola).3 Regional analyses that do occur are under-emphasised. 
Taylors 2006 work, for example, titled ‘China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise,’ is 
actually a series of case study chapters on China in Southern Africa. This choice of Southern 
Africa is justified by it being ‘the centre of attention for Beijing on the continent… (and) 
emblematic of various historical and current tendencies that have staked out Beijing’s 
engagement with the wider continent.’4 Although true to some extent, this ultimately ignores 
the interesting specificities of Southern Africa as compared to other regional relations. Other 
regional assessments tend to focus on Africa’s Regional Economic Communities,5 or the 
African Union (AU) more generally.6 These efforts, however, often retain Chinese actions as 
their entry point: Van Hoeymission sees Chinese actions at the UN as being of prime interest, 
for example, and Ikome concentrates on FOCAC and then assesses where the AU fits in.  
In the security studies field, China’s apparent lack of ‘Western-style’ overt interference 
almost forces scholars to accept a broader conceptualisation of ‘security.’ Alden, for 
example, discusses Beijing’s concern with citizens’ security, reputational security, and firm-
level security.7 Human security issues have become increasingly prominent in relation to the 
rivalry between local Africans and Chinese immigrants, especially local market traders.8 
Some assume that a conflict is brewing between the US and China over their rival interests on 
the continent that will greatly impact African security, but this remains entirely speculative at 
present.9 Chinese UN anti-piracy Naval efforts in the Gulf of Eden have garnered attention 
(which will increase due to the new Chinese military base in Djibouti),10 and arms sales to 
Africa are also flagged.11  
There is interest in China’s financial contributions to the AU’s African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA), although these actually remain paltry compared to the West (even 
                                                          
3 For example, Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (CITY: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Chris Alden, China in Africa, (London: Zed Books, 2007); Daniel Large, ‘China & the 
Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan’, Review of African Political Economy 35(115), (2008), pp. 93-
106; Lucy Corkin, Uncovering African Agency: Angola’s Management of China’s Credit Lines (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2013); Abiodun Alao, ‘China and Zimbabwe: The Context and Contents of a Complex Relationship’, 
SAIIA Occasional Paper 202, October 2014. 
4 Ian Taylor, China and Africa Engagement and Compromise (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), p.4. 
5 Sara Van Hoeymissen, ‘Regional Organizations in China’s Security Strategy for Africa: The Sense of 
Supporting “African Solutions to African Problems”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40(4), (2011), pp. 91-
118; Courtney Fung, ‘Global South solidarity? China, regional organisations and intervention in the Libyan and 
Syrian civil wars’, Third World Quarterly 37(1), (2016), pp. 33-50. 
6 Francis Ikome, ‘The role and place of the African Union in the emerging China-Africa partnership’, in Axel 
Harneit-Sievers et al, eds. Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa (Oxford: Pambazuka, 2010), pp. 
201-212 
7 Chris Alden, ‘Seeking security in Africa: China’s evolving approach to the African Peace and Security 
Architecture’, NOREF, March, 2014. 
8 Howard French, China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa 
(New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2014). 
9 Yun Sun and John Thornton, ‘China in Africa: Implications for US Competition and Diplomacy’, Brookings 
Institute, 2012; Loyd Thrall, ‘China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for US National Security’, 
RAND Corporation, California, 2015. 
10 Marc Lanteigne, ‘Fire over water: China's strategic engagement of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden crisis’, The 
Pacific Review 26(3), (2013) pp. 289-312; Chinese military base takes shape in Djibouti, The Financial Times, 
12 July 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/bcba2820-66e1-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614 (accessed 23/02/19). 
11 Pádraig Carmody and Ian Taylor, ‘Flexigemony and Force in China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Sudan 
and Zambia Compared’’ Geopolitics, 15(3), (2010), p. 497; Lauren Dickey, ‘Weapons-for-Oil Exchanges in 
Contemporary Sino-African Relations’, Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal 1(1), (2011), pp. 63-85. 
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following FOCAC VI’s pledge of $60 million over three years towards APSA which was a 
major increase on previous sums).12 Shinn and Eisenmann’s invaluable summary discusses 
security relations across Africa but remains broad and military-centric.13 The other most 
serious and compelling effort to date, Alden et al’s recent edited work specifically focusing 
on China’s new security role, still lacks the essential regional element. It instead details many 
of the aforementioned issues, case studies and continental patterns.14 The ‘region’ to analyse 
remains Africa, rather than the African sub-regions so crucial to the continent’s security 
dynamics.  
While the above works are unquestionably valid and valuable, a more bottom-up, genuine 
and in-depth regional security analysis is lacking. We know that Chinese interest in African 
security issues are increasing to some extent with the various declarations and initiatives 
prevalent at FOCAC meetings and in Chinese White Papers.15 Yet no obvious paradigm shift 
in Beijing’s ideology or methodology is readily apparent: non-interference might be mildly 
tweaked or twisted but is not about to be dismantled. Uncovering China’s genuine impact on 
African security must move beyond assessing the public declarations or the few over-
referenced case studies. Serious security analysis should contain a clear regional component 
wherever it occurs, but in the African context it is particularly important that this regional 
aspect to security dynamics is seen as centrally important.  
Identifying the ‘Regional’ impacts 
The article starts from an International Political Economy viewpoint that sees regionalism as 
‘a comprehensive multidimensional programme, including economic, security, environmental 
and many other issues.’16 Nation-States are important, but they are not the only unit of 
analysis or relevant actor in contemporary global politics, especially in Africa. China affects 
and is affected by, African intra-regional geopolitics through its supposedly state-to-state 
interactions which, in reality, involve a more complex, evolving set of actors than is assumed.  
This article’s conception of ‘security’ is likewise multidimensional. It takes a constructivist 
view that sees ideas, norms and values as important in shaping perceptions of (in)security 
whilst including the importance of materialist factors. Human security, which focuses on the 
individual as referent point, is useful and relevant, as is the role and importance of more 
‘traditional’ factors and state leaders in shaping regional security concerns.17 The local-level 
security issues identified below show China’s influence and role beyond a simplistic, 
military-centric security analysis.  
Unpacking and better understanding the state in Africa and African’s experiences of 
(in)security allows for a clearer picture of China’s role therein. Hettne’s understanding that 
                                                          
12 Saferworld, ‘China’s growing role in African peace and security’, Saferworld Report, January 2011, pp. 57-
59; Sara Van Hoeymissen, ‘Chinas Support to Africa’s Regional Security Architecture’, The China Monitor 49, 
(2010), pp. 10-15. 
13 David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012). 
14 Chris Alden et al, eds. China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent (Cham: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
15 David Shinn, ‘FOCAC: The evolving China-Africa security relationship, in FOCAC VI: African initiatives 
toward a sustainable Chinese relationship’, CCS, 2015, p. 7;  FOCAC VI Johannesburg Declaration, 25.4; 
FOCAC VII Beijing Action Plan, 6.1; Chinese State Council, China’s Second Africa Policy Paper, 2015. 
16 Bjorn Hettne, ‘Beyond the 'New' Regionalism’, New Political Economy 10(4), (2006), p. 549. 
17 Funmi Olonisakin, ‘A Human Security Approach to Peacemaking in Africa’, Strategic Review for Southern 
Africa 37(1), (2015), p. 3; Yu-tai Tsai, The emergence of human security: A constructivist view, International 
Journal of Peace Studies (2009), pp. 19-33.  
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the ‘national interest’ is often, in fact, a group- or person- specific interest,18 is particularly 
apt for the African context generally, as well as China’s role within the continent’s ongoing 
state-building processes. Soderbaum’s notion of regime-boosting behaviour and shadow 
regionalism is also useful in problematising the African state, along with Bach’s recognition 
of the survival and accumulation strategies being pursued.19 Both recognise how state leaders 
are able to initiate (or prevent) particular regionalisation activities, both formal and informal, 
for their own personal wealth and power. The behaviour of particular leaders, and the 
different levels of agency and influence they enjoy domestically, regionally and 
internationally, plays a key role in shaping China’s relations with the continent.  
African Regionalism and Regionalisation 
Globalisation and its more multi-polar system has included a trend towards a regionalised 
world, where regions form as a means of engaging with and protecting against the re-
structured global order. Hettne sees ‘five levels of regional complexity or regioness’:  a 
geographical or ecological grouping defined by natural boundaries; a social system with 
relations between different human groups across borders; an organized, institutional grouping 
cooperating in particular fields; as regional civil society, with more organised and converging 
communication and value systems; and a region acting as a distinct unit with agency.20  
In Africa, regionalism – the political effort to organise states into particular cooperative 
groupings – occurs alongside, in competition with and sometimes contradicts regionalisation 
– the more complex social and less-formal processes by which particular regions may 
emerge.21 The African Union has always been explicit and deliberate in creating regional 
structures as the necessary building blocks for continental integration.22 The AU’s belief in 
the importance of, and reliance upon, its RECs, along with the Regional Organisations and 
Regional Mechanisms (ROs and RMs) which form the African Peace and Security 
Architecture, is re-emphasised and re-iterated throughout Agenda 2063.23 This is an effort to 
forge the continent’s regions into Hettne’s third category: a region creating institutional links 
and structures to form ‘organized cooperation in any of the cultural, economic, political or 
military fields.’24 The AU’s regionalism has sought to institutionally frame and direct 
whatever organic regionalisation processes are occurring. 
This African regionalism has always had security provision and promotion as centrally 
important (rather than merely as financial or socio-economic institutions). But, making use of 
Hettne’s levels of regioness, it is clear that these are being forged to varying degrees of 
success along differing geographical, social and civil society groupings, with regionalisation 
                                                          
18 Hettne, Beyond the 'New' Regionalism, p.554. 
19 Fredrik Söderbaum, The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa (Palgrave, 2003), 
pp. 68-69; Daniel Bach, ‘The global politics of regionalism: Africa’, in Mary Farrell et al, Global politics of 
regionalism: theory and practice (London: Pluto Press, 2005), pp. 171-186, p.184. 
20 Bjorn Hettne, The New Regionalism: implications for Global Development and International Security 
(Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1994), p. 1-8. 
21 Hettne, Beyond the 'New' Regionalism, pp. 544-545.  
22 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study, 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/report-of-the-apsa-assessment-study-july-oct-2010-eng.pdf (accessed 13 June 
2016); Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 3.l, 11 July 2010 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf (accessed 13 June 2016). 
23 An Overview of Agenda 2063 (AU Commission, 2015), https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33126-
doc-11_an_overview_of_agenda.pdf (accessed 10 December 2018); Agenda 2063, Popular Version May 2016 
(AU Commission, 2015), https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33126-doc-03_popular_version.pdf 
(accessed 10 December 2018).  
24 Hettne, The New Regionalism, p.7. 
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processes shifting their relevance. The ambition of them forming actor status within the 
international realm varies widely across the continent. Regional rivalries, security dynamics 
and the behaviours/ambitions of particular leaders greatly affect the regionalisation processes 
occurring outside the prescribed institutional frameworks.  
This article groups Africa’s regions below into North, East, Horn, Central, South, and West 
as a useful analytical tool and, admittedly, for ease. It agrees with Hettne that Africa is too 
dispersed, complex and varied to be classed as a ‘region’ in its own right.25 The discussion of 
African regions, rather than sub-regions, is therefore deliberate. The AU’s own literature, 
APSA framework and Agenda 2063 all make this same distinction.26 The author understands 
that overlap, interplay and complex regional or sub-regional processes are, indeed at work. 
Further detailed insights into China’s role in their unfurling is welcome. The scope of this 
article, however, does not allow it to waste time deciding whether a ‘region’ exists or not, 
which can be a distraction. Buzan and Weavers Regional Security Complex Theory, for 
example, insists that any one nation (or unit) can only belong to one regional security 
complex at any one time.27 This greatly reduces its applicability to Africa, where regions 
cannot easily be delineated and demarcated from each other (overlapping membership of 
different RECs also occurs). But this does not mean a regional analysis of security dynamics 
cannot occur.  
Below is a useful signposting exercise to flag the importance of this regional delineation of 
African security issues and China’s role within the continent therein. The below sections 
focus largely on political and security issues, but this does not discount the utility in 
analysing alternative issues and actors (market traders, for example), but whatever unit is 
chosen a regional analysis would add value. This framework helps understand the three main 
areas of focus for this article, by which African agency within the China-Africa relationship 
occurs. Intra-regional geopolitics appears largely between states, whether within the 
institutionalised AU APSA or REC formations, or other regionalisation processes. Local-
level security issues, understood within a constructivist and human security framework, 
impact upon the lower level, daily lives of Africans. Finally, leader behaviour - namely the 
way in which African leaders seek or gain leverage against China - sees the manipulation of 
domestic and regional processes, and Beijing’s role within them. 
China’s varied continental role 
China’s overwhelmingly state-centric, sovereignty-minded ideology with its emphasis on 
bilateral relationships has not prevented Africa’s inherently regional security environment 
shaping Chinese impacts. African security dynamics enmesh China into complex 
regionalisation processes, where regional hegemons are pivotal to relations: they act as nodal 
states with notable degrees of influence in their respective regions. The Chinese role in 
African security issues impacts through three broad areas: intra-regional geopolitics; local-
level security concerns; and the behaviour and abilities of African leaders. Relationships with 
formal Regional Organisations are varied and less relevant, although worth noting.  
Historical context 
                                                          
25 Hettne, Beyond the 'New' Regionalism, p.566. 
26 The African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union, Durban, 9 July 2002, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7781-treaty-0024_-
_protocol_relating_to_the_establishment_of_the_peace_and_security_council_of_the_african_union_e.pdf 
(accessed 23 May 2017); An Overview of Agenda 2063. 
27 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and powers: the structure of international security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 26, 48. 
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Despite leaders emphasising that China and Africa have a long history of alliances and 
cooperation, the reality of China’s historical role varies from region-to-region. Beijing played 
a notable role in Africa’s post-independence state formation processes, by supporting 
liberation groups and sub-state actors in the 1960s and 70s that tried to create pro-China 
regimes in the newly formed states. In Central and West Africa this proved mostly disastrous. 
Blatant breaches of non-interference occurred through training of dissidents, and foolhardy 
meddling in places like Zaire, currently known as The Democratic Republic of the Congo, led 
to resentment and outspoken criticism from various independence leaders. China’s public 
support for Biafra rebels in Nigeria also caused difficulties.28  
In Southern Africa, Chinese support for independence and anti-apartheid struggles was much 
more welcome, until the Sino-Soviet split then caused intense embarrassment: China 
supported the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) in the Angolan Civil War (due to 
USSR backing the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)) who were also 
aided by racist South Africa during a 1975 offensive. This exposed China’s interference as 
entirely self-interested. Meanwhile, however, they successfully supported the victorious 
Mugabe in Zimbabwe, which is quite a rare example of a genuinely prolonged historical 
allegiance aligning with modern day relations.29 In the Horn, cordial relations were largely 
maintained despite the intense instability and Soviet interests in Ethiopia. North Africa’s 
relative wealth made it far harder to penetrate: China saw Egypt as a key diplomatic partner, 
for example, but this did not prevent Nasser publicly criticising China over their actions in 
Tibet.30 
Shaping regional hegemony? 
With Chinese engagement being more broken than is now openly referenced by current 
leaders, Africa’s regional and regionalisation processes took shape and developed their own 
geo-political dynamics largely independent of China (although, yes, China was always 
present). The modern post-2000 Chinese surge into Africa, therefore, has played into and 
adapted to the unique conditions found in each region. Regional geo-politics is affected by 
regionalisation processes that may help or hinder the development of more formal regional 
cooperation, as economic and military power becomes centred on particular states or 
challenged by regional rivals.  
The Nigerian hegemon in West Africa is the nodal state around which security dynamics 
unfurl. China’s incursions have been problematic and contested, but they have ultimately 
made significant inroads with frenetic and varied activity.31 Nigerian regional hegemony is so 
insurmountable that this Chinese role cements existing regional security dynamics, despite 
scrambles for oil in places like Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire and Senegal potentially influencing the 
relative importance of lesser rivals.32  
South Africa, however, which enjoys strong ties with China, sees its substantial regional 
power and wealth more challenged than is sometimes assumed.33 Despite the historic 
                                                          
28 Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa, pp. 284-322. 
29 Taylor, China and Africa, pp. 75-115; Abiodun Alao, ‘China and Zimbabwe: The context and contents of a 
complex relationship’, SAIIA Occasional Paper 202 (2014). 
30 Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa, pp. 228-283. 
31 A US$8.3 billion railway project granted under Obasanjo was cancelled by parliament in 2009, and a former 
Central Bank governor wrote a scathing denunciation of China’s presence in 2013, for example.  
32 Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa, pp. 287-298; Samuel Amanor, ‘Chinese money for Ghana’s natural 
resources: The real cost’, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, Working Paper, August 2013. 
33 Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, ‘South Africa’s symbolic hegemony in Africa’, International Politics 
52(2), (2015), pp. 239-254. 
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difficulties, shared interests post-2000 sees Angola as the lynch-pin of Beijing’s Africa 
strategy: the so-called ‘Angola Model’ of oil exports exchanged for Chinese-funded 
infrastructure projects has become synonymous with Sino-Africa relations. Luanda-Pretoria 
dynamics have been altered by China’s presence. Angola’s diamonds, oil, and strong army, 
with investment from China and elsewhere, means that Angola's ‘potential as a regional 
power is clear… (it) could become a future rival to South Africa in Southern Africa.’34 
North Africa sees less Chinese influence due to its more balanced portfolio of investors (and 
a rather dominant US in the Egyptian hegemon and elsewhere),35 however in the Horn there 
is even clearer involvement of China in the geo-political dynamics. Chinese investment in 
Sudan during its prolonged international pariah status has helped maintain its strong regional 
economic and military influence. Along with major oil purchases China constructed an arms 
plant which made Sudan a leading military equipment manufacturer in Africa, whilst the 
security environment encountered there had a serious impact on China National Petroleum 
Corporation’s (CNPC) subsequent global strategy.36 Ethiopia, Sudan’s major regional 
protagonist, saw Chinese activity as economically critical from the mid-2000s onwards. Both 
Ethiopia and Sudan’s ambitious Dam Programmes have heavy Chinese investment, and pit 
the foes in direct competition over who garners more regional influence in the energy 
sector.37  
China, therefore, feeds into African regional geo-politics and high-level regionalisation 
processes by (to some extent) shifting and shaping where economic and military power is 
held in each region. But the nature of China’s role and influence is varied in each place. The 
multifaceted nature of regionalisation means that this higher-level influence is not the only 
area where dynamics shift and where China plays a role.   
Localised issues 
Local-level security issues also show worthy continental comparisons, but always with 
important regional nuances and intrigues. Regionalisation in Africa is greatly affected by the 
local security challenges that citizens and states encounter, and there are marked regional 
differences as to which are most prominent and China’s role therein.  
Here, North Africa stands out for offering a peculiar mix of Jihadi threat and intense political 
instability. The Arab Spring has proven problematic but China has weathered it rather well. 
Beijing publicly respected the choice of the Egyptian people,38 and impressively evacuated 
                                                          
34 Adekeye Adebajo, ‘South Africa and Angola: Southern Africa's Pragmatic Hegemons’, Regional Integration 
Observer 6(1), (2012), http://www.ccr.org.za/index.php/media-release/in-the-media/newspaper-
articles/item/181-south-africa-and-angola-southern-africas-pragmatic-hegemons (accessed 23 May 2016) 
35  Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa, pp. 235-238; Eugenia Pecoraro, ‘China’s strategy in North Africa 
and future economic challenges for the Mediterranean region’, EUGOV Working Paper, 25, November 2010, p. 
11. 
36 David Shinn, ‘Chinese Involvement in African Conflict Zones’, China Brief 9(77), (2009), p. 8; Robyn 
Meredith, The Elephant and the Dragon: The Rise of India and China and What It Means for Us All (New 
York: Norton, 2008), p. 166; Luke Patey, ‘Learning in Africa: China’s Overseas Oil Investments in Sudan and 
South Sudan’, Journal of Contemporary China 26(107), (2017), pp.756-768. 
37 Mebratu Seyoum and Jihong Lin, ‘Private Chinese Investment in Ethiopia: Determinants and Location 
Decisions’, Journal of International Development 27(7) (2015), pp. 1223-1242; Harry Verhoeven, ‘Black Gold 
for Blue Gold? Sudan’s Oil, Ethiopia’s Water and Regional Integration’, Chatham House Africa Programme, 
AFP BP 2011/03, June 2011. 
38 ‘Egypt enters into initial deal for 15 projects worth $10 bln with China – minister’, Reuters, 15 June 2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-investment-china/egypt-enters-into-initial-deal-for-15-projects-worth-10-




35,000 Chinese citizens from Libya.39 Algeria based Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
has threatened to target Chinese workers across North Africa and killed twenty-four Algerian 
paramilitary police escorting Chinese in 2009.40 Similar issues have occurred in West Africa 
where Boko Haram have attacked and kidnapped Chinese workers, but less so elsewhere.41 
West Africa has also seen China (rather impressively) retain its non-interference principle 
during coups in Guinea (2008), Mauritania (2008) and Niger (2010),42 as well as making in-
roads into Cote D’Ivoire after the 2002 Civil War and again after the 2010-11 election 
crisis.43 
Partly as a hangover from its liberation era support and meddling, and partly due to its 
continued engagement with dubious government networks (most notably in Sudan), Chinese 
made Small Arms and Slight Weapons (SALW) are a key feature in countless local level 
security issues across Africa but particularly in the Horn and Central regions. China North 
Industries Group Corp (NORINCO) was criticised for shipping arms to Juba during the early 
stages of the South Sudan Machar-Kiir conflict in 2015.44 Southern African workers also 
refused to unload a Chinese arms shipment in 2008, due to them likely being used in a 
Zimbabwean post-election crackdown.45 China’s involvement in the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy 
efforts are entirely unique to the Horn, as is the recent construction of the Chinese Naval 
Base in Djibouti.46 Despite the publicity and interest, however, this piracy issue is more a 
global trade problem rather than a specific African challenge. More significant and 
impressive in a region riddled with inter-state tensions is the $3.4 billion Chinese built 
electric 755 km railway linking Djibouti and Ethiopia, which opened in October 2016.47 
So, despite the non-interference principle, China does feed into the more localised 
regionalisation process and regional security challenges which African states and people 
confront. In the African context, where national institutions and state structures are more 
contested than elsewhere, these local issues can prove particularly problematic and influential 
in shaping regional dynamics as they become difficult to control and direct. Lack of 
institutional frameworks, however, also increase the influence of respective leaders who are 
less constrained than those operating in more formalised settings.   
The importance of African Leaders 
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African leaders are vitally important to these geo-political and more localised dynamics. The 
complexity of issues does not mean they can simplistically control and direct all 
regionalisation processes, but they retain crucial roles in determining the impacts and 
influence of Beijing in their respective regional contexts. Khartoum-Addis rivalry has seen 
pivotal roles for Omar Bashir in ensuring his regime’s survival by courting Chinese 
investment, just as Meles Zenawi’s ability to resist Western influence and launch an African-
born development state model had China as a crucial player. China apparently applied 
behind-the-scenes pressure on Bashir to halt Darfur killings in 2007, and supported sanctions 
against both leaders in the 2015 South Sudanese Machar-Kiir Conflict.48  
Southern African rivalry also has clear leadership components. Mandela maintained 
diplomatic ties with Taipei for several years post-Apartheid despite their previous support for 
the racist Pretoria regime. This was probably due to China’s backing of the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC), the main rival to Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC), during the 
anti-apartheid struggle. He officially switched South Africa to recognising Beijing in 1998, 
however.49 South Africa’s Mbeki and Angola’s dos Santos had frosty relations, but Zuma’s 
subsequent courting of Angola was in no small part due to China and other BRICS’ 
investments in Angola offering opportunities to South Africa.50 And despite a deteriorating 
economy, Zimbabwe is still central to regional security and China was an essential ally to 
Mugabe, becoming his main arms supplier following embargoes.51 At the time of writing, any 
role China played in facilitating the coup in Zimbabwe that removed Mugabe in November 
2017 remains entirely speculative.52 The Chinese ambassador’s threat to leave Zambia if Sata 
won the 2006 election whilst running on an anti-Chinese ticket also garnered much attention 
(but did not prevent continual expanding relations following Sata’s eventual 2011 election 
victory).53 
In Central Africa, both Laurent and Joseph Kabila received military training in China,54 and 
Joseph’s 2007 state of the union address angered Western ambassadors by praising China for 
rescuing the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).55 Deby in Chad has avoided US pressure 
by engaging China whilst also suspending CNPC operations over an oil spill.56 Paul Biya’s 
Cameroon, where China also has more significant oil interests, was apparently buying 
Chinese website-filter technology amid 2017 public protests in order to avoid less subtle 
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internet blackouts. During this time Biya was also formally invited to meet Xi Jinping in 
China to further cement ties.57 Libya’s Gadhafi stood out in the North: his relations with 
Taiwan always complicated relations with Beijing; he publicly warned against a new era of 
Chinese imperialism in 2000; and then apparently visited arms companies in China whilst a 
UN backed embargo was in place (to Beijing’s embarrassment and denials). The regional 
fall-out from Gadhafi’s downfall also indirectly led to China sending a UN peacekeeping 
‘guard team’ to Mali during the 2013 crisis.58 
African leaders play a unique role in shaping the nature of Chinese engagement and 
regionalisation processes underway. Their different personalities, backgrounds and abilities 
have significant impact on their regional context and China’s respective role. They also, of 
course, have been key in initiating formal regionalism structures, at both the AU where 
formal regional frameworks are established and then in implementing them (or not) in their 
respective region.    
Formal regionalism 
China has a unique relationship with the AU’s REC ‘building blocks’, the continent’s formal 
regionalist institutions. Chinese interest seems to be tied entirely to the functionality and 
importance of the respective RECs. It is yet to take on any serious security component. The 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is an important regional actor and plays a 
notable role in fairly well-structured Chinese relations. There were regular meetings and 
increasingly institutionalised cooperation throughout the 2000s.59 Likewise, the regional 
importance of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sees relatively 
advanced relations: an China-ECOWAS Business Forum resulted in numerous Memorandum 
of Understanding’s (MoU) between ECOWAS and Chinese companies or municipal 
governments.60  
The Horn’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) is ambitious but has 
ultimately limited importance, which has been mirrored by China’s own engagement. China 
agreed an MoU providing $100,000 for IGADs operational costs in 2011,61 and then 
experimented with a ‘mediator-like’ role between sides during the 2013 South Sudan 
violence. Beijing quickly reverted to supporting IGAD’s own forlorn efforts, however, once 
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realising the complexity of the situation.62 Meanwhile, the dysfunctionality and unimportance 
of Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) means China shows no serious 
interest beyond lip-service, such as stating a willingness to work with it to help resolve the 
2013 Central African Republic.63 In North Africa, China set up its own China-Arab States 
Cooperation Forum for all 22 Arab League members, rather than engaging the Arab Maghreb 
Union (UMA).64 
China, therefore, seems interested in and willing to engage with African regionalism to some 
extent. Formal regional organisations are seen as useful avenues for cooperation and 
influence, increasingly in relation to security issues. But the nature of that engagement is 
inconsistent, as China apparently interacts with Africa’s RO’s on their own terms and when it 
is in their interests. Their preference for state-to-state engagement has not yet been 
superseded by a fully regional approach.   
The continental picture above of interwoven geopolitical rivalries, local security issues and 
varying importance of particular leaders highlights a role for China in African security 
dynamics that varies across regions. Africa’s complexity is exemplified by its simultaneous 
regional- and state- building efforts. Formal regional architecture is being created that is often 
playing ‘catch-up’ with the regionalisation processes already underway. Meanwhile, 
empirical state sovereignty is still being pursued amongst regional rivalries, despite the 
planned regional structures ultimately requiring a ceding of state authority to some extent. 
This regional perspective ensures an Africa-centric starting point for analysis, whilst 
emphasising the non-linear transfer of impacts and influences between Africa and China. 
This is not a one-way process of influence directed by Beijing. China feeds into dynamics by 
engaging the formal regional structures to some extent, whilst also (somewhat unwittingly) 
being used by regional actors for their own geopolitical purposes or being drawn into local 
security issues. To date, China’s role is felt far more within informal regionalisation 
processes which include a variety of state and non-state actors, rather than relationships with 
any institutionalised regional structures.  
Structural and local impacts in East Africa 
The above regional portrait is admittedly broad and somewhat simplistic. Its purpose is to 
highlight the regional differences and similarities in the security issues encountered by China 
and their resultant role in (potentially) shaping dynamics. A more focused analysis of the East 
African context below outlines the nuances and uniqueness of the region in greater detail. 
Again, regional geo-politics, unique local level security issues, and particular leaders play an 
important role in determining Chinese impacts, alongside noteworthy relations with the East 
African Community (EAC) regional body.  
East Africa within the China-Africa story 
Greater East Africa relations are central to the espoused narrative arc that China-Africa 
relations enjoy a history of trade rather than conquest. Admiral Zheng He’s famous peaceful 
voyages to Africa from 1418-33 sailed to modern day Somalia and Kenya. The Tanzania-
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Zambia TAZARA railway is championed as a beacon of prolonged China-Africa friendship. 
Tanzania also played a pivotal role in gaining African votes for Beijing’s famous 1971 
ascension the UN Security Council.65  
During that same post-independence period, fluctuating national rivalries and mistrust 
amongst leaders were a hallmark of regional security dynamics in East Africa and led to the 
collapse of the original EAC I (1967-1977).66 A rejuvenated EAC arrangement, however, was 
formerly relaunched in 2001 comprising Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. Formal EAC 
regionalist expansion has always played catch-up with the regional security dynamics and 
regionalisation processes compelling integration: Rwanda and Burundi’s inclusion in 2007 
was at least partly done to help stabilise them after their respective Civil Wars; and cross-
border trade with South Sudan made their 2016 inclusion somewhat inevitable.67 Inter-
regional tensions and personal animosity between leaders have nonetheless remained present. 
Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya formed the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ (CoW) in 2013, for 
example, after Tanzania (and Burundi) became hesitant over a proposal to push forward with 
political federation.68 Individual state building processes remain complex and incomplete 
even as EAC attempts to forge its own regional security function. Within this unstable 
fluctuating regional dynamic, China’s re-emergence as a global power with a capacity for 
mega-construction aligns them with the already progressing EAC architecture. 
Increased Chinese investment is evident in each EAC member country, to varying extents, 
and a November 2011 China-EAC Framework Agreement was the first of its kind between 
China and an African REC (it has infrastructure construction as a key feature).69 Chinese 
arms are supplied to differing degrees to all countries and have been noticeably present in all 
serious regional conflicts since independence, which have been some of the most brutal and 
bloody in Africa (and the world).70 
Oil and rivalry emerges 
Oil is the most serious geopolitical issue of the moment in East Africa. The region has all the 
ingredients required for oil-related conflict: nefarious foreign interests, poor domestic 
governance structures and dangerously high local expectations are all present.71 Oil has been 
found in the areas historically most marginalised and neglected by central government, 
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meaning existing tensions have become amplified. Only Burundi has not had direct oil-linked 
violence of some kind, although exploration activities there have been relatively minimal.72   
The East African oil sector is therefore a major regional security issue, and China plays a key 
role within it. Uganda’s proposed oil refinery and crude export pipeline to the Indian Ocean 
are key development issues for the whole of EAC. China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s 
(CNOOC) has a 33% stake in Uganda’s oil find, although companies from UK, Norway and 
France have more concessions in the region. China is clearly seen as a major market for 
future oil sales, however, and is heavily involved in the vitally important geo-strategic 
infrastructure projects that the sector will directly rely upon, as well as those that are to be 
funded through anticipated revenues. The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), a new rail line 
originally proposed to connect Mombasa-Kampala-Kigali with plans also to link to Juba, has 
an estimated eventual cost of $11 Billion. China is positioned as a major financier (the $3.8 
billion Mombasa-Nairobi link opened in June 2017).73 Despite warnings from authors such as 
Brautigam that it is simplistic to assume China’s oil-for-infrastructure deals are as prevalent 
throughout Africa as is sometimes assumed,74 in East Africa they do appear either explicitly 
or implicitly. Infrastructure became top of the entire EAC development agenda following a 
2008 fact-finding mission to China by ministers, and is linked directly to new oil finds 
appearing and China’s willingness to finance projects.75 
These mega-projects provide integration and development benefits as well as potentially 
problematic schisms within a vulnerable region. Kenya’s aggressive push on SGR and wider 
infrastructure agenda, for example, was at least partly to counter the threat to Mombasa port 
posed by Tanzania’s proposed Chinese-funded Bagamoyo mega-port. The CoW effort, which 
had SGR as its flagship project, was intended to show Tanzania how quickly progress could 
be made whether they were involved or not.76 Three years of media-hype and controversy 
over CoW created a perception that EAC could even potentially split, with public spats and 
clear inter-personal tension between leaders very evident. Military conflagration was not 
ruled out, during interviews with certain politicians.77 Eventually, in 2015 Tanzania 
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announced its own $14 billion railway network project linking Dar es Salaam with DRC, 
Rwanda and Burundi, after a funding agreement was agreed with China (although 
subsequently, Turkish firms have been competing with China to construct the different 
sections of track).78 The furore around CoW has subsequently diminished, but only once a 
more re-engaged Tanzanian leadership began re-asserting its regional position by utilising the 
presence and willingness of China to help fund projects.  
Terror and Guns: global issues with local impacts 
Alongside these serious geo-political, structural security issues related to the oil sector and 
mega-infrastructure construction, terrorism is East Africa’s most prominent local-level 
security concern. The region has seen some of the most notorious terrorist atrocities in the 
developing world: the 1998 Al-Qaeda US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya; 
spectacular Al-Shabaab attacks at Westgate mall (2013) and Garissa University (2015) killing 
67 and 147 respectively in Kenya; and the 2010 Al-Shabaab bomb attack in Kampala, 
Uganda killing 74 people. Burundi has also seen credible public threats from Al-Shabaab and 
Rwanda is a possible source of operatives and affiliates.79  
China plays a role in the terrorism issue through the global ivory trade and SALW 
proliferation. China is not the only market for ivory, but there is no doubt that the current 
East African poaching epidemic is linked to the influx of Chinese. Ivory has long been a 
source of income for rebel groups such as Uganda’s barbarous and universally condemned 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab garner significant income from 
the trade. SALW proliferation is an enabling factor in ivory poaching, as well as in the wider 
terrorist menace and structural instability in East Africa. Chinese arms have a long history of 
circulating in the region, from the liberation-era struggles through to Beijing’s special 
relationship with Sudan and into the modern era.80 A representative from Uganda’s National 
Focal Point on SALW noted in interview: ‘Chinese made arms are the main arms in the 
region, the main ones. If you have been to Tanzania, the AK-47s they have are Chinese 
versions. All along here. You go to DRC, South Sudan,that is it.’81  
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China is aware of its own role in the ivory trade and the resultant public criticism it receives, 
to which it is extremely sensitive. Beijing has enacted certain measures under degrees of 
pressure from East African governments and a global anti-poaching campaign, culminating in 
its domestic ban on ivory trading and processing by the end of 2017.82 China’s role in SALW, 
however, is more problematic for Beijing to seriously acknowledge or tackle. China has 
participated in Saferworld organised Africa-China-EU dialogues around such issues, but 
consistently argues it is the responsibility of recipient governments to stop SALW falling into 
nefarious hands. China is yet to sign or ratify the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and have not 
actively helped EAC’s anti-SALW efforts.83 
Regional leaders and Museveni’s games 
This context helps enable East African states to behave in certain ways. China’s (lack of) role 
and effort in particular areas provides space to pursue militarised, non-holistic responses to 
security challenges where governments can shift blame or court attention depending on their 
specific interests. East African leaders often ask the US and EU to supply high-tech responses 
to ivory poaching such as drones, automatic weapons and Special Forces deployment.84 This 
has helped create an arms race between poachers and anti-poaching units across the region. 
Various national armies have been implicated in human rights abuses, killing of protected 
animals, and cover-ups and collusions over poaching under the pretext of combatting the 
issue.85 The emerging EAC security apparatus remains very military-centric. Despite EACs 
perceived economic aims and espoused people-centred approach, a more traditional long-
standing arms race is also occurring between member states. Notably, this arms race has been 
further encouraged by Chinese arming of the Islamist Sudanese government in Khartoum, 
which Uganda in particular felt obliged to react to.86 
Of the regional leaders that China has encountered within these regionalisation processes, 
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has proven particularly adept at manipulating the 
Chinese role to suit his regional agenda and shape regional security dynamics. Museveni has 
always pushed more forcefully for EAC political union than any other leader and has played 
a unique role in each member states political economy. Museveni has meddled in Kenyan 
domestic politics, he has a long personal, problematic relationship with Rwanda’s President 
Kagame, and chaired the Regional Initiative for Burundi which helped end the 1993-2005 
civil war. Tanzanian hesitancy over political federation stems, at least in part, from suspicion 
over Museveni’s role in pushing it, yet he was able to help diffuse public tensions between 
Rwanda’s Kagame and Tanzania’s Kikwete during the CoW spats.87 
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China’s role has somewhat aided Uganda’s regional anti-terrorist role by, indirectly, helping 
to fund and arm the threats that Museveni reacts against. He has also proven adept at 
engaging the West when it suits him and resisting them when it does not. Post-9/11, President 
Museveni manoeuvred himself to become an indispensable part of US security strategy in 
Africa. He inserted long-standing domestic security challenges such as the LRA (largely 
armed by Khartoum) into the new US Global War on Terror discourse, and then initiated the 
Uganda-led AMISOM mission in Somalia against Al-Shabaab.88 Uganda is known for asking 
both the West and Chinese for long lists of unnecessarily expensive military equipment 
apparently needed to tackle particular issues, whilst also being uncooperative on particular 
matters. They resisted a Saferworld study group from visiting Uganda’s domestic arms 
manufacturing plant (originally built with aid from China's Wanbao Engineering 
Corporation), for example.89 Museveni has also shown no particular interest in halting 
Uganda’s role in the ivory trade as a source, consolidation hub and major transport route.90 
The oil sector and related Chinese presence has also been played well by Museveni. He 
deliberately brought CNOOC into Uganda in a geo-political move against American 
companies. He has personally intervened to decide on contractor rights amongst rival Chinese 
companies on projects such as the Karuma Dam, amongst others, but also prevented over-
reliance on China by dropping a Chinese consortium’s bid to build Uganda’s $4 billion oil 
refinery.91 He has played regional geo-politics within regional infrastructure drives more than 
any other leader. Museveni pushed into Kenya’s wildly ambitious Lamu Port-South Sudan-
Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) infrastructure project by making Uganda’s oil find officially 
part of the plan, and then utilised the CoW’s Chinese funded projects to make Kenya’s 
President Kenyatta focus more on EAC’s Northern Corridor (LAPSSET would tie Kenya 
more to Sudan and Ethiopia). Museveni later angered his supposed CoW allies by altering the 
agreed Kampala SGR links from Kigali to Juba, and Uganda’s oil pipeline end point from 
Kenya to Tanzania.92   
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In summary, China’s impact on security dynamics in East Africa occurs through their 
structural role in providing an alternative global power partner with differing norms and 
capacities, including the willingness to provide multi-billion dollar financing opportunities 
for mega-infrastructure construction linked to energy sector interests. Simultaneously, 
complex local security issues are fed through nefarious, shadowy networks of SALW and 
illicit goods trading which have Chinese presence to varying extents at various points in 
supply chains. China has not created the terrorism menace, but nonetheless there are 
prominent groups utilising Chinese arms and citizen’s ivory interests to their advantage. This 
plays into and helps shape regional geo-political dynamics significantly, as African leaders’ 
competing state building projects vie for regional influence and economic progression. 
Museveni has proven particularly adept at manipulating both formal EAC regionalism and 
other regionalisation processes as a means of ‘regime-boosting’ and maintaining his domestic 
position in Uganda to suit his own regional security agenda. He has cleverly incorporated 
Chinese presence into that strategy. Uganda’s oil find and geopolitical value is actually rather 
modest, yet Museveni has used China’s regional presence extremely well to help position 
Uganda as a key driver in the fight against terrorism and link Uganda’s oil interests to 
different EAC partners.  
The importance of the ‘regional’ 
As per the broad continental picture presented, East Africa highlights how a regional 
perspective centralises the role of Africa and Africans within China-Africa relations and how 
a fluid, back-and-forth influence is occurring. Rebel or terrorist groups utilise the illicit 
Chinese arms and financial flows to their ends. Beijing has been pushed to engage in anti-
poaching efforts and arms dialogues where they cannot feel most comfortable. The thirst or 
demand for infrastructure, which has been self-evidently lacking for generations, sees African 
governments now take advantage of Chinese willingness to provide finance and their pursuit 
of newly discovered oil and minerals. Chinese companies compete amongst many others, 
however, and have not simply steamrolled into each and every contract. China has not overly 
influenced which leaders have emerged over the past years, but it is those leaders who now 
provide the opportunities or pose the challenges that the resurgent China encounters.  
Regional case study: centralising Africa  
Similar regional case study analyses would be beneficial for all areas of Africa. This article’s 
broad overview hinted towards unique regional dynamics in each place, but more detailed 
research into the regionalism and regionalisation underway would uncover the intricacies 
therein. In the Horn, for example, how exactly is Sudan-Ethiopia rivalry exacerbated or 
diminished by the infrastructure projects underway or planned? What are the social, 
development and security consequences of the Djibouti-Ethiopia rail link? In Central Africa, 
what are the regional implications of Kabila’s removal in DRC and what is China’s role 
therein? How do Angolan and Zimbabwean relations with China impact on its rivalry with 
South Africa in Southern Africa? In West Africa, what is China’s role in Ghana’s struggling 
oil sector and how does this affect relations with Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria? And in the 
North, how has the Arab Spring affected China’s opportunities in the region vis-a-via long 
standing Western interests? These questions are just a few examples among many 
possibilities,that would centralise African regional security issues into the China-Africa 
narrative.  
This article’s key argument, therefore, is not necessarily the specific findings of the broad 
regional overview or even the somewhat more detailed East African case study. These were 
both necessarily brief due to time and space constraints. This article has seen value in the 
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regionalism and regionalisation concepts articulated by Hettne, but is also not arguing that 
this is the only valuable analytical framework.  It does argue, however, that it is essential to 
adopt a regional approach to analysing China’s African relations, particularly when 
investigating the security implications of the unfurling developments. This is especially 
important in ensuring that the much-needed Africa-centric analysis becomes more prevalent 
in the academic literature. A regional approach demands asking not ‘what is China doing in 
Africa and what are the security implications?’; but instead ‘what are Africa’s inherently 
regional security issues and where/how/why does China play a role in them?’.  
Framing research questions in this way uncovers different and more relevant answers. In the 
Horn, for example, the first China-centric question would highlight action such as UN 
Peacekeepers in South Sudan and anti-piracy efforts in Somalia. The second regional, Africa-
centric question would highlight issues such as energy competition amongst regional powers, 
or the volatile state and nation building processes underway that see a complex web of actors 
and institutions vying for positions. These are far more significant for regional security and 
China will likely play a deeper, more interesting role within them. Citizens’ lives and security 
in the Horn will be far more affected by infrastructure like the Djibouti-Ethiopia railway or 
improved electricity supply (whether coming from Addis or Khartoum), than they will be by 
a military base being built or a UN peacekeeping deployment. Notably, issues like SALW 
proliferation may well appear within both forms of questions; but having China as the starting 
point of analysis risks assuming that they are causing resultant security issues, whereas the 
Africa-centric regional question highlights the more significant and nuanced role that African 
leaders play within the proliferation issue.  
The role and importance of China 
The regional approach highlights a more serious Chinese role within African security issues 
than is often noted. Scholars searching for China’s security role often uncover various low-
level issues. These include human security implications of projects related to displaced 
communities or working conditions, the increased but still paltry financial contributions to 
APSA, or Chinese citizen evacuations. China’s most serious impacts on African security will 
not occur by providing funds to the formal regionalism processes underway, or from local 
market-trader resentments. It will occur through their role in the continent’s regionalisation 
processes and fluctuating security dynamics. These other areas of focus remain relevant, but 
this regional approach uncovers far more serious, long term, potentially devastating impacts, 
such as: increased geo-political rivalry amongst regional heavyweights; intensely unstable oil 
sectors capable of backsliding regional progress by significantly; risky infrastructure projects 
potentially increasing government debt-burden and continued impoverishment of locals; and 
the activities of horrifically brutal terrorist groups. 
Importantly, this is not about automatically blaming China for such findings: it is about 
uncovering their role, whether intentional or not, in complex African regional security 
dynamics that have far-reaching implications. China’s Africa strategy champions state 
sovereignty and non-interference, but Beijing is adapting somewhat by engaging security 
issues through the AU and regional structures.93 However, whether the AU’s APSA delivers 
stability on the continent, just as whether the connected RECs deliver development, remains 
intensely uncertain. China’s vocal support for such frameworks may become even less 
significant as new African security mechanisms are created. The Multinational Joint Task 
Force in the Lake Chad Basin, the G5 Sahel, or Gulf of Guinea Commission, for example, do 
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not automatically conform to the original AU plans or espoused Chinese strategy (or, indeed, 
to the simplistic carve up of African regions presented in this article).94 
The fate, relevance and perhaps reimagining of the AU’s regional arrangements will play a 
key role in Africa’s security and development trajectory in the coming decades. China’s role 
within those processes will likewise be key in determining their ultimate impact. Unless 
China provides a more sophisticated appreciation for, and engagement with, Africa’s regional 
and regionalisation processes, it risks mimicking a Western-style ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach 
to Africa. The West’s ideologically driven neo-liberal economic model and liberal 
peacebuilding approach has been applied in templated form to a variety of contexts in Africa, 
with persistently detrimental consequences for African citizens. Although the Chinese 
method may be different, blanket enforcement of and blind adherence to non-interference 
may prove equally problematic.  
Respect for sovereignty is not a new or innovative approach, but is something of a 
romanticised call-back to the founding principles of modern international relations which 
may or may not still be relevant (that uncertainty is especially present in Africa). In regional 
contexts where sovereignty is hotly contested, or Chinese impact and influence is already 
being felt regardless of it not being formal ‘interference’, China would do well to initiate its 
own regional approach which would necessarily vary across the continent. 
Conclusion 
China’s most serious impact on African regional security issues (which is actually better 
phrased as African regional security issues are impacted upon by China) does not occur 
through Chinese UN peacekeeping, anti-piracy efforts or protection of their own citizens. 
Instead, it occurs through China’s enmeshed role in intra-regional geopolitics, complex local-
level security issues, and the behaviour of leaders encountered. The nature of these issues are 
observably different in each African region. 
This article has shown that in East Africa, the nature of regional integration within the East 
African Community has a noticeable Chinese role. China’s interest in natural resources and 
capacity for infrastructure mega-construction is a key component in regional geo-politics, 
with Chinese made SALW and China-bound ivory also being tools utilised by a range of sub-
state terrorist groups. Leader characteristics and inter-personal relations, with Uganda’s 
Museveni being of particular note, have shaped China’s role and influence significantly (and 
arguably more than Beijing has been able to affect them). African leaders in other regions 
would do well to learn from lessons emerging from East Africa around how they may utilise 
Chinese presence for particular benefits while resisting them in certain instances. Hopefully 
also in how to avoid clashes or regional rivalries from appearing that risk the realisation of 
those benefits.  
The article has also shown that the specificities of broad continental trends and observations 
vary significantly in Africa region to region. Serious well-researched analysis is required in 
each region to complement this article’s East African starting effort. Any case study 
investigation of China-Africa relations must recognise and centralise the importance of the 
regional security environment. Notions of statehood and regionalism in Africa continue to 
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evolve and interact. China’s new serious global power role, materially capable of influencing 
these unfurling processes, must be understood in this regional context to fully appreciate their 
impact on African peace and security.  
Africa’s national and regional institutions do not necessarily account for and represent the 
more complex local realities which shape the lives of African citizens. Nation-state structures 
in Africa are, at the very least, problematic and contested. In the more severe cases, they are 
major contributors to people’s daily insecurity. China’s emphasis upon state sovereignty does 
not somehow create a reality of empirically sovereign African states that represent the 
interests of their citizens. Africa’s regional frameworks and institutions, likewise, do not 
necessarily represent or effectively protect people’s security concerns. Again, China’s 
perhaps increasing interest in them will not automatically change that reality.  
If China’s ambition is to strengthen existing national and regional structures, regardless of 
their contested role in Africa’s multifaceted regional security issues, its present methods will 
likely continue. If China’s leaders have a genuine concern for improving the lives of African 
citizenry, a more challenging regional security approach will be needed. China should be 
aware of, and react to, its complex role in the regionalisation processes underway, which vary 
across the continent. This would not be a straight forward process. It requires thoughtful self-
reflection on what priorities should be pursued and whose interests should be protected. The 
ways and means by which China may engage and assist with improving African security – if 
China decides that is, indeed, a priority – will differ in each regional context. At the same 
time it would also require supporting continental frameworks and processes. Historically, the 
West has been stubborn and naïve in its approach to Africa, imposing policies and 
frameworks which are not suitably adapted to the varied contexts encountered. At present, 
Beijing also seems unlikely to fundamentally shift its state-centric, sovereignty respecting, 
largely elite-focused diplomatic engagement, which will likely cause significant issues on 
both sides of the relationship in the coming years and decades. 
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